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NATIVE COURTS OF NORTHERN NIGERIA:
TECHNIQUES FOR INSTITUTIONAL
DEVELOPMENT
DAVID N. SMITH*
I
One of the first acts of Nigeria's new military Government following
the coup d'etat that disposed of the previous Government on January 15,
1966, was to announce that its ultimate goal with regard to judicial re-
form is to integrate the locally administered native courts into the
Regional Governmental court structure. As a first step, the more than
750 native courts of Northern Nigeria,' previously supervised by the
Ministry of Justice, were placed under the supervision of the politically
independent Judicial Department. 2 More recently, the native courts have
been made independent of the native authorities, the local government
units,3 and the judicial powers of the Emirs' courts have been with-
drawn.4
* Secretary, International Legal Studies, Harvard Law School; LL.B., Harvard,
1961; Inspector of Native Courts, Ministry of Justice, Northern Nigeria, 1963-1965.
1 The Native Courts (Jurisdiction and Powers) Notice, 1967 (Northern Nigeria
Legal Notice [hereinafter N.N.L.N.] 9 of 1967) (2 March 1967), lists the various
native courts by province and division. Nigeria, previously divided into four re-
gions, is now composed of twelve states. States (Creation and Transition Provi-
sions) Decree, 1967 (Decree No. 14 of 1967). Six states comprise the former region
of Northern Nigeria. The latter term is used here for convenience. Within each
state the local government units are called native authorities.
2 Delegation of Powers (Native Courts) Notice, 1966 (N.N.L.N. 15 of 1966)
§ 2(b) (dated 6 May 1966 with effect from 1 April 1966). This notice was made
by the Military Governor of Northern Nigeria in exercise of powers conferred
by § 9(4) of the Constitution (Suspension and Modification) Decree, 1966. The
unit within the Ministry of Justice, a department within the executive branch,
directly responsible for the administration of the native courts was the Commis-
sion for Native Courts. This administrative units has now been placed under the
control of the High Court (Judicial Department).
The powers originally exercised by the Minister of Justice have been transferred
to the Chief Justice of the High Court. Delegation of Powers (Native Courts)
Notice, 1966 (N.N.L.N. 15 of 1966).
3 See West Africa, April 15, 1967, at 485; letter from Commissioner for Native
Courts, High Court of Justice, Kaduna, to author, Feb. 5, 1968. The first courts
to be placed under Government control were those in the regional capital territory.
Native Courts Law, 1956 (Amendment) Edict No. 1/67 (Kaduna Capital Ter-
ritory). "In Northern Nigeria this is a real revolution since . . . it has always
been thought, control of [the native] courts was of the highest political importance
to Emirs and Chiefs." West Africa, supra.
Effective April 1, 1968, control of native courts will vest in the six states of
the former northern region, subject to the continued supervision of the Chief
Justice. Each state has enacted governing legislation modeled on the Native Courts
Law, 1956 (ch. 78 of the Laws of Northern Nigeria, 1963) [hereinafter as N.C.L.]
and has renamed the courts "area courts." See, e.g., North-Western State Edict
No. 1 of 1967 (the Area Courts Edict, 1967). The structure of the area courts
system will largely imitate the regional system existing under the N.C.L. For ease
of citation, reference hereinafter will be made to the structure existing under the
law, rather than to the six-fold duplication of that structure.
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It is not surprising that the attention of the new Government should
have focused immediately on the native courts, for their role has been
an important political and social issue in Nigeria for some time. In the
period just prior to independence, for example, special legislation was
required to allay the fears of non-Moslem minorities who might appear
before Moslem courts in the North.5 In addition, the close association of
native court personnel with the executive personnel of the native au-
thorities had long been criticized for its possible political implications.,
Much of the criticism of the northern courts, both before and after
independence, came from the southern regions and the federal capital
which were impatient with the pace at which various institutions of the
northern region were becoming integrated into the national governmen-
tal structure. Shortly after the coup it was reported that with regard to
the future of native courts, "there is already a fairly strong body of
opinion in favour of their complete abolition, or at least abolition of their
criminal jurisdiction."'7 This sentiment was no doubt reinforced when
early in 1966 this latter step was taken in the Western Region.
8
Without question, much of the southern concern about the native
courts of the North was based on a failure to recognize the cultural,
historical and geographical differences between the two regions. The
legal profession in the southern regions-itself a critic of the northern
courts--has been and still is substantially more developed than that of
the northern region.9 In the southern states a relatively limited number
of magistrate courts are able to service a small land area. In the North,
"[a] drive by a good road from Ilorin, just within the southern boundary
...to Katsina, near the frontier with the Niger Republic, covers 510
For the present there will be only one Chief Justice who will constitutionally
be the Chief Justice of each of the six new states.
4 West Africa, supra note 3, at 485.
5 See text accompanying notes 120-24 infra.
8 Indeed in those native authorities where the Emir is the chief executive
officer, some personnel of the Emir's Court have performed both executive andjudicial functions. The recent White Paper on the Government's Policy for the
Rehabilitation of the Tiv Native Authority 1718 (Kaduna, 1965) stated that, "It
is considered that the Grade B Civil and Criminal Courts have become discredited
by some of their Presidents being involved to a greater or lesser degree in poli-
tics....
"The principle of separating the judiciary from the executive should be con-
tinued in these courts and the members should not have outside executive respon-
sibility."
7 "Northern Nigeria's Revolution," West Africa, April 2, 1966, at 373.
S Customary Courts (Jurisdiction in Statutory Criminal Offences) (Revoca-
tion) Order, 1966 (Western Nigeria Legal Notice 15 of 1966) (W.N. Edict
No. 2).
9 In October, 1967, it was reported that there were 122 legal officers and 217
private practitioners in the East, Midwest, West and the Federal Territory. In
the North there were 22 legal officers and 13 practitioners for a population more
than double that of the southern states. West Africa, October 7, 1967, at 1300.
The legal officers figure for the southern regions does not include legal officers
in the East, which figure is not given.
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miles; and from Birnin Kebbi, near the western frontier, to Mubi, near
the eastern, over 1,000 miles."' 0 All-weather roads, joined by roads im-
passible in the rains, "lead to large centres of rural population where a
permanent criminal court is essential."'
The fact does remain, however, that the native courts of Northern
Nigeria have in recent years come under increased pressures generated
by a developing society. Where once these courts functioned within pri-
marily rural, non-commercial societies, they are now, for the first time,
being called upon to settle disputes involving the growing class of in-
digenous traders. Where once individual courts dealt almost exclusively
with homogeneous populations, expanded commercial activity and im-
proved methods of transportation have brought increased movement of
individuals across tribal boundaries.
At the same time, political independence has brought increased con-
cern about judicial independence and basic procedural protections for
criminal defendants. The growth of the northern legal profession and
the emergence of a local law school have brought with them an increased
concern for institutionalized justice and a recognition of "legal" prob-
lems that heretofore had been submerged in the administration of social
justice. If, in earlier days, the cultural conflict in which the northern
courts found themselves was epitomized in the administration of "British
justice" by British courts on one side of the street in Zaria and the ad-
ministration of "native justice" by native courts on the other, the cul-
tural conflict today is epitomized in the contrast between the three-month
class for native court judges in one classroom at the Zaria law school
and the three-year LL.B. class across the hall.
The various pressures for adapting the native court system to new
social and political realities have led to significant legislative response.
This response is most dramatically illustrated by the introduction of
westernized penal and criminal procedure codes.' 2 Yet the basic cultural
problem remains and is bound to persist in the foreseeable future: the
native court system, administered by lay judges, cannot be abandoned in
favor of a western court system administered by trained lawyers. Not
only are there significant manpower, financial and geographic problems,
but there is also evidence that lawyer-administered courts would not be
acceptable to large segments of the population.
10 "Northern Nigeria's Revolution," West Africa, April 2, 1966, at 373.
11 Id.
12 All courts with criminal jurisdiction, whether native or otherwise, apply the
provisions of the Penal Code (1959) (ch. 89 of the Laws of Northern Nigeria,
1963), and the Criminal Procedure Code (1960) (ch. 30 of the Laws of Northern
Nigeria, 1963) [hereinafter cited as Criminal Procedure Code (1960)]. Jurisdic-
tion has been given to certain native courts with respect to some civil legislation
previously administered only by British-styled courts. See, e.g., The Native Courts
(Jurisdiction in Personal Income Tax Cases) Order in Council, 1963 (N.N.L.N.
23 of 1963, as amended by N.N.L.N. 130 of 1963).
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These facts were recognized by the pre-coup Government; consequently
it adopted a policy-carried forward by the present Government-di-
rected not toward the abolition of native courts but rather toward an
up-grading and adjustment of the existing system. Thus, while integra-
tion of the native and western-styled court systems is an announced
Government policy, it is a long-range one, and one which may ultimately
be accomplished through a merging of the two systems rather than
through the displacement of the native court system by the district and
magistrate court system.
Central to the Government policy of accommodating the native court
system to a developing society has been the creation of a number of
transitional devices aimed at bridging the gap between the traditional
and modern court systems. These transitional devices, the main focus of
this article, are of particular significance to lawyers concerned with
African legal development, for they represent important examples of
how developmental problems can be solved short of simply imposing a
western model. The goal of adjusting western legal concepts and meth-
ods of legal training to meet local needs is one to which lip service is
frequently paid in the African context but one that is not often attained
in fact.18
The following short history of the native courts in Northern Nigeria
will give some sense of the context in which these adjustments in native
court administration and judicial review have taken place.
II
Perhaps the most significant fact underlying the present viability of
the native court system in Northern Nigeria is that when British ad-
ministration began in 1900 there existed an effective and well established
system of tribunals firmly integrated into the social structure of much
of the region. These tribunals were part of the general governmental
structure centered around Moslem Emirs who had been installed in
power as a result of the 1804-1810 Fulani holy war.1 4 Although Islam
had been introduced as early as the fifteenth century, the establishment
of the Fulani empire was directed at the purification and expansion of
Islam. In conformity with Islamic patterns of legal administration, new
courts under qualified Moslem scholars were established, jurisdictions
were defined and a basic pattern of appeals was created.15
Is See Gower, Independent Africa, The Challenge to the Legal Profession 90-96
(1967). "The main lack everywhere ... is real effort toward adapting the received
English law and local statute law to local conditions." Id. at 94.
14 The historical background may be found in Burns, History of Nigeria 49-62
(1929). Developments in one particular emirate are traced in Smith, Government
in Zazzau 73-136 (1960).
15 Smith, supra note 14, at 94-95.
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Impressed by the highly developed and successful methods of govern-
ment and legal administration in force in the far North-as well as by
the problems inherent in the imposition of a foreign legal system16-the
British administration gave assurances that the Mohammedan system
of law would not be interfered with and that the power of native courts
to deal with native cases according to the local law and custom would
be upheld.17 At the same time, however, the British were interested in
rationalizing and developing the native court system; therefore the need
for basic guiding legislation was felt. The first such legislation was the
Native Courts Proclamation of 1900.18 It introduced the first statutory
native courts in what became the administrative unit of Northern Ni-
geria. The Proclamation authorized the Government's representative in
each province-the Resident-to issue warrants establishing native
courts consisting of at least four persons. The warrants were to be issued
after consultation with local chiefs or Emirs, and provision was made
that the chief or Emir concerned would appoint the court members.' 9
The main purpose of the 1900 Proclamation was not so much the ad-
justment of an existing native court system to imported patterns of ad-
ministration, although a certain balance of power between the local
rulers and the British was established, as the identification and recog-
nition of the various tribunals exercising juridical functions throughout
the territory. However, as this process of defining centers of judicial
power was going forward, problems were being encountered. Leaders
of Moslem areas protested that the four-member court was not consis-
tent with the customary constitution of Moslem courts, which were
traditionally run by single judges. In non-Moslem areas unofficial tri-
bunals more consistent with local social patterns persisted. The first
problem was remedied in 1904 by an amending law which permitted the
establishment of courts composed of one or more members. 20 Aspects of
the second problem have persisted up to the present.
21
The 1900 Proclamation was repealed and re-enacted in 1906 by the
Native Courts Proclamation No. 1 of 1906 which established the basic
legislative pattern for subsequent developments in the native court sys-
tem until 1933.22 Four types of native courts were recognized: Emir's
courts, to be known as judicial councils; alkali's courts, consisting of
single Moslem judges sitting with or without other persons who might
16 See Lugard, The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa 540-41 (5th ed.
1965).
17 But cruel and inhuman punishments were prohibited.
18 Native Courts Proclamation No. 5 of 1900 (Northern Nigeria).
19 The warrants were subject to the approval of the High Commissioner.
20 Native Courts Proclamation No. 11 of 1904 (Northern Nigeria).
21 See note 25 infra.
22 The Native Courts Proclamation No. 1 of 1906 is reproduced in Laws of the
Protectorate of Northern Nigeria, 1910, 597-601.
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act in conjunction with the alkali as judges or merely act as assessors;
chief's courts in non-Moslem areas, also to be known as judicial coun-
cils; and multi-member courts of the type provided for in the 1900 legis-
lation. Court members were to be appointed by Residents with the
approval of the Governor except that in Moslem areas, consultation with
the local Emir was required.
Jurisdiction of native courts was provided in all civil and criminal
cases in which "all the parties are natives ;" jurisdiction was denied in
those cases where a non-native of African descent or a native in govern-
ment employment was a party, except where the Resident gave consent.
Territorial jurisdiction and subject-matter jurisdiction were defined in
the court's individual warrant. Both the law to be administered by the
court and the procedure to be used were to be in accordance with the
native law and custom prevailing in the territory over which the native
court had jurisdiction. Courts were given varying powers of punishment
and subject-matter jurisdiction, and for this purpose were graded "A,"
"B," "C," or "D," with "A" courts having the greatest powers. Only
nine judicial councils were given the broadest powers, including capital
punishment.
28
It seems fair to state that "after the initial mistake of 1900 [the re-
quirement of four-member courts], the native courts established in
Northern Nigeria more or less reproduced the pre-existing traditional
native courts, '24 except with regard to the quasi-judicial, quasi-arbitra-
tional courts which traditionally had existed in many tribal areas but
for which no provision was made.25 The 1906 legislation, however, was
significant in that it super-imposed on the existing system two elements
of British control. It was provided that Residents would at all times have
access to the native courts and could, either on their own motion or on
the application of the aggrieved party, (a) suspend, reduce or otherwise
modify any sentence or decision of a native court; (b) order a re-hear-
ing before a native court; or (c) transfer any cause or matter, either
before trial or at any stage of the proceedings, to the Provincial Court,
which was presided over by the Resident. In addition, provision was
made for the appointment by the Resident of certain native courts as
23 Brooke, Report of the Native Courts Commission of Inquiry, Appendix and
Summary 69 (1952). Campbell, Law and Practice of Local Government in North-
ern Nigeria 2 (1963).
24 Nwabueze, The Machinery of Justice in Nigeria 74 (1963).
25 See, e.g., Bohannan, Justice and Judgment Among the Tiv 7-8, 160-214
(1957). The author states that there are three types of courts in Tivland: the
British-type magistrates' courts, native courts and arbitrational folk "courts"
which he refers to as "moots." In this context it is relevant to note that "even
where selectivity in the acceptance of cultural elements from outside is recognized,
analyses of the contemporary African scene too often fail to grasp the fact that
selection is additive and not necessarily substitutive." Bascom and Herskovits,
Continuity and Change in African Cultures 6 (Bascom and Herskovits ed. 1959).
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courts of appeal. Any person dissatisfied with a decision of a native
court could appeal to the court appointed by the Resident. Thus, in the
same way that the pre-British Moslem legal system centered on the
Emirs, after 1906 the native court structure centered on the Residents.
It was through them that courts were created, membership was ap-
pointed and cases reviewed.
The rationale for investing control of native courts in the hands of
the Resident rather than in a superior British court was that political
officers would be closer to "native motives" and that in the context of a
developing political system "occasions may arise when the strictly legal
aspect must give way to expediency. ' 26 The pre-eminent position of the
Resident was retained until 1962 when it was considered that more
judicial and less administrative control was called for. It will be seen,
however, that administrative control still exists and that present patterns
of supervision have been influenced in part by the practice of control by
Residents.
At the same time that legislation was being developed for the native
courts, a parallel system of British courts was being established. These
courts were given jurisdiction over persons with whom the native courts
could not deal: non-natives, natives in the service of the government and
persons living within certain townships. In addition, British courts had
concurrent jurisdiction with the native courts over members of the na-
tive population, and a separate appellate system was to be administered.27
What existed was a parallel system of courts which had no contact at
any point except in the Resident's ability to transfer a case from a native
court to the British Provincial Court, which was presided over by the
Resident. There were no appeals from native courts to courts within the
other system. Each system was independent and self-contained.
The non-professional and flexible control administered by the Resi-
dent was well suited to the Moslem North where, as has been noted, a
workable judicial system had functioned before the advent of the Brit-
ish. The degree of interference with the native courts which the Native
Courts Proclamation of 1906 and later Ordinances authorized was not
26 Lugard, supra note 16, at 539.
27 The Protectorate Courts Proclamation No. 4 of 1900 authorized three types
of British courts: a Supreme Court, Provincial Courts and Cantonment Courts.In 1914, upon the amalgamation of the two separate Governments of Southern
and Northern Nigeria, a single Supreme Court was created for the country andCantonment Courts were replaced by Magistrates' Courts. See Supreme Court
Ordinance, 1914; Provincial Courts Ordinance, 1914. Provincial Courts were
abolished in 1933 and replaced by a High Court and Magistrates' Courts. See
the Protectorate Courts Ordinance No. 45, 1933. Today the British-styled courts
in Northern Nigeria consist of a High Court (with original and appellate juris-diction), Magistrates' Courts (with criminal jurisdiction only), and District Courts(with civil jurisdiction only). High Court Law (1955) ; Criminal Procedure Code§ 6 (1960) ; District Courts Law (1960) (chs. 49, 30, 33 of the Laws of Northern
Nigeria, 1963).
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as extensive as might have been provided for. The interference which
was permitted was kept within tolerable bounds in Moslem areas
through administrative restraint. This loose control, however, was less
well suited to the southern provinces and the non-Moslem areas of the
North, where, prior to 1900, centers of juridical power were difficult to
define. In these areas the Native Courts Ordinance had the effect of
imposing artificial native courts in districts which had previously been
adequately served by tribunals that had grown out of the local social
organization. As a result, in many areas unofficial tribunals continued to
function in a twilight zone between arbitration and the application of
native law and custom.
This problem and others prompted a general review of the native
court system in 1933. The need for deference to traditional modes of
settling disputes was recognized as well as the need for a revised system
of appeals. Legislation to this effect was adopted in 1933.28 Provision
was made for the inclusion in court membership of those persons who
had traditionally exercised judicial power, and native court areas were
reorganized. Jurisdiction of native courts was extended over persons
who, though not traditionally subject to the jurisdiction of native tri-
bunals, led the same mode of life as the general native community. At
the same time a system of appeals from certain native courts to the Brit-
ish courts was instituted as well as a more uniform system of appeals
within the native court structure. Different provisions were made for
Moslem and non-Moslem courts. Appeals lay from the district Moslem
courts to the chief alkali's court, a higher grade native court of first in-
stance, and ultimately to the Emir's court. Appeals from the original
jurisdiction of the Emir's court went to the High Court. In non-Moslem
areas appeals went either to a magistrate's court or to the High Court.
Appeals from the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court lay to the
West African Court of Appeal. It is important to note, however, that
the magistrate and High Courts were not given supervisory power over
the native courts; this was left with the Residents.
The 1933 reorganization is of particular significance in that it incor-
porated two basic changes in the general philosophy underlying the na-
tive court structure. On the one hand the deference paid to the traditional
foci of judicial power represented an abandonment of earlier attempts
to secure uniformity both within the native court system of the North
and that of the whole country.29 It was recognized that the court of a
28 The Native Courts Ordinance No. 44 of 1933, which became effective April 1,
1934.
29 Uniformity was attempted in the North under the Native Courts Proclama-
tion No. 5 of 1900 which required that all courts be four-member courts. Uni-
formity was attempted throughout the country following the amalgamation of the
Governments of Southern and Northern Nigeria in 1914; the Native Courts Or-
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territory must grow out of and be a part of the local social structure to
be effective. At the same time, however, the provision for appeal to
British courts in certain instances represented a movement toward a
more professional approach in the native court system generally. It was
a significant, though limited, contact between two previously self-con-
tained systems: "[t]he 1934 judicial reform introduced a system of ap-
peals which blended the previous dual organization of courts and law
without giving assistance [to] the point of integration." 0
Although the reforms of 1933-34 did much to strengthen the native
court system in Northern Nigeria and to increase the confidence of the
populace in the courts, further problems grew out of the reforms them-
selves. As noted earlier, the jurisdiction of native courts over persons
was extended to include those persons who had adopted the mode of
life of the community. This was necessitated largely by the movement
of individuals between tribal areas. These persons expected that their
own tribal laws (called "personal law" in Nigeria) would regulate the
whole range of their family and social relationships. However, because
each native court was to apply "the native law and custom prevailing in
the territory over which the tribunal has jurisdiction,"'3 the application
of any personal law was ruled out in favor of the lex fori. This created
a potentially dangerous situation because, "if the system of the lex fori
is to be workable at all, it has to be supplemented by rules of jurisdiction
that prevent a court ever coming at all to decide a case for which the lex
fori would be an unexpected, and thus an unjust, law."'8 2 Until 1943 the
conflict between the individual's expectation that his personal law would
be applied and the native court's inability to apply it was generally
avoided because most strangers tended to settle in special quarters of
the larger towns and these areas were excluded from the territorial
jurisdiction of the native courts. At that time these enclaves were rela-
tively small and there was "an attempt to frame a simplified [judicial]
system on English lines run by an administrative officer as local author-
ity who was also the magistrate before whom the cases were brought. '33
In 1943, however, it was felt necessary to bring the strangers' quarters
under native authorities and consequently within the jurisdiction of the
native courts. Special native courts, termed "mixed courts," were
created to deal with the problem of mixed populations.84 The bench was
dinance, 1914, applied to all native courts. Under the 1933 Ordinance the provisions
extending jurisdiction over persons (see text accompanying note 28 supra) af-
fected native courts in the northern provinces but not in the southern provinces.
30 Brooke, supra note 23, at 73.
81 The Native Courts Ordinance No. 5 of 1918, § 11(1) (a).
32 Rheinstein, Problems of Law in the New Nations of Africa, in Old Societies
and New States 230 (Geertz ed. 1963).
83 Brooke, supra note 23, at 81.
84 Id.
BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
comprised of representatives of the major tribal groups in the commu-
nity. The creation of courts of this type represented a novel approach to
native court problems and carried forward the theory that native courts
must command the respect of the community served. The problem re-
mained, however, that the court could only apply the lex fori and not
personal laws. Fortunately, during this early period, powers of recon-
ciliation, arbitration and pressure on parties to accept what was regarded
as an equitable settlement of a dispute prevented serious problems.
Further difficulties were created by the fact that the appeals proce-
dure was relatively complex., Some fourteen different channels of appeal
were available in varying situations and the alternatives and categoriza-
tions were not readily comprehensible to the average layman. In addi-
tion, questions arose as to what law should be applied on appeal. The
existence of a dual system of courts did not create serious problems of
judicial administration as long as the native courts dealt primarily with
cases involving native law and custom and the English courts dealt pri-
marily with cases involving English law. Problems emerged, however,
when the two systems were joined at the appellate level and "modern
principles were used to test a procedure centuries older."33 The problem
was illustrated most dramatically in the discrepancies that existed be-
tween Moslem and English laws of homicide, particularly in the failure
of Moslem law to regard provocation as a mitigating circumstance. The
conflict resulted in a number of judicial and legislative pronouncements
in which various sorts of accommodation were put forth, but none was
entirely satisfactory.3 6
By the nineteen fifties, five problems seemed central to the future de-
velopment of native courts: the law to be applied in civil cases, the law
to be applied in criminal cases, the appellate structure, the course of
Islamic law and the mode of control and supervision of the courts. These
were problems which did not readily lend themselves to ad hoc judicial
or legislative pronouncements and it was felt that a general review of
the purpose and direction of development of the native courts was needed.
This review was undertaken by a Commission of Inquiry in 1951 and
resulted in the present basic native court legislation, the Native Courts
Law, 1956.87
85 Id. at 67.
36 In Gubba v. Gwandu Native Authority, 12 W.A.C.A. 141 (1948), it was
held that native courts must exercise their criminal jurisdiction in accordance with
the Criminal Code. Since native courts could not be expected to administer the
Code because of lack of training and an absence of translations into the vernacular,
this decision was reversed by legislation. Native Courts Ordinance, 1948 (No. 36
of 1948). In 1951 a Native Courts (Amendment) Ordinance was passed which
provided that a native court shall not impose a punishment in excess of the
maximum punishment permitted by the Criminal Code.
87 N.R. No. 6 of 1956. The Commission's findings are reported in Brooke, supra
note 23.
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Recommendations of an international Panel of Jurists which was in-
vited by the Regional Government in 1958 to review general court or-
ganization and the different systems of law in force in the region led to
additional basic changes in the law and to the adoption of a Penal Code
and Criminal Procedure Code which supplanted all other law in the
criminal field.88 The Panel was invited to reconvene in 1962 and still
further reforms resulted from their recommendations.
8 9
III
By 1956 the basic framework for the development of the native courts
of Northern Nigeria for the foreseeable future was established. The Na-
tive Courts Law, 1956, and subsequent amendments clearly reflect the
feeling of both the Commission of Inquiry and the Panel of jurists that
the native courts are, and must continue to serve as, the main legal
forum of Northern Nigeria and not merely as specialized tribunals sup-
plementing the British-styled High Court, Magistrates' Courts and Dis-
trict Courts.
Through the Native Courts Law, 1956, most of the major problems
of appellate structure, court organization and applicable law have been
resolved, and it is through this legislation and the (State) Area Courts
Edicts of 196740 that the sudden impact of the indigenous and imported
systems has been and will be tempered. The jurisdiction of native courts
to try any cause or matter is limited to the territory defined in each
court's warrant 4 ' and to the persons and subject matter defined in the
Native Courts Law. In general terms, native courts have jurisdiction
over all parties "who belong to a class of persons who have ordinarily
been subject to the jurisdiction of native tribunals" and over those per-
sons "whose general mode of life is that of the general native commu-
nity."' 42 While these terms are seemingly vague, in practice conflicts in
jurisdiction over persons seldom arise. If a person does allege that he is
88 See Statement by the Government of the Northern Region of Nigeria on the
Reorganisation of the Legal and Judicial Systems of the Northern Region
(Kaduna, 1958).
89 See Statement Made by the Government of Northern Nigeria on Additional
Adjustments to the Legal and Judicial Systems of Northern Nigeria (Kaduna,
1962). Findings resulting from the Panel's second session are discussed in Ander-
son, Return Visit to Nigeria: Judicial and Legal Developments in the Northern
Region, 12 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 282 (1963).
40 See note 3 supra. Changes made by the various State Area Courts Edicts are
largely ones of terminology. After April 1, 1968, native courts will be graded
"area courts grades I, II, and III"; appeals will continue to go to the Provincial
Courts which will be called "upper area courts." See, e.g., North-Western State
Area Courts Edict, 1967, § 17. The Area Courts discussed infra, at p. 79, are to
be merged into each state system.
41 N.C.L., §§ 3(2), 15(1).
42 N.C.L., § 15(1) (a) (ii).
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not subject to the jurisdiction of native courts, application may be made
to the High Court where the issue will be resolved.43
Subject-matter jurisdiction is somewhat more complex. Because in-
dividual courts are at various stages of development in legal expertise,
and as a technique for distributing the litigation work-load, courts are
graded "A," "A limited," "B," "C," or "D."'44 Thus, in civil matters, a
grade "D" court has jurisdiction over matters relating to succession to
property where the value of the property does not exceed fifty pounds.
A grade "B" court has jurisdiction in such matters if the value of the
property does not exceed five hundred pounds.45 In criminal matters
jurisdiction is limited according to the specific offense; for example, no
court below the grade of "A limited" may try an offense of kidnap-
ping.46 In addition, powers of punishment are also restricted; a grade
"D" court may not imprison a person in excess of nine months or im-
pose a fine exceeding fifteen pounds.47
To permit courts to hear cases in which persons from other tribal
areas are parties, native courts are authorized, under the Native Courts
Law, to apply not only the native law and custom prevailing in the area
of the jurisdiction of the court, but also the law binding between the
parties. 48 In mixed civil causes (i.e., causes in which two or more of
the parties are normally subject to different systems of native law and
custom) the court may apply a variety of laws: the particular native law
and custom which the parties agreed or intended should regulate the
transaction; a combination of two or more native laws or customs which
the parties agreed or intended to regulate the transaction; or, in the
absence of agreement, intention or presumption, the native law and
custom-or combination of both-which it appears to the court ought
to regulate the transaction. If no law or custom is applicable, the court
may apply principles of natural justice, equity and good conscience.49
In criminal cases, native courts must administer the provisions of the
Penal Code, 1959, and the Criminal Procedure Code, 1960, which, pur-
suant to recommendations of the Panel of Jurists, displaced all native
law and custom in criminal matters in Northern Nigeria, and thus
avoided the intolerable situation of having a multiplicity of criminal
laws.50 At the time of introduction of these Codes, it was clear that na-
43 N.C.L., § 16.
44 N.C.L., § 17.
45 N.C.L., First Schedule.
46 Criminal Procedure Code (1960) (ch. 30 of the Laws of Northern Nigeria,
1963) § 12 and Appendix A.
47 N.C.L., First Schedule.
48 N.C.L., § 20.
49 N.C.L., § 21. In mixed land causes, the court must apply the native law and
custom in force in relation to the land in the place where the land is situated.
N.C.L., § 21(3).
50 N.C.L., §§ 22, 26(3).
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tive court judges could not be expected "to change overnight, from their
existing law and procedure to a perfect application of a new penal code
and a new code of criminal procedure." 51 Consequently, it was provided
that an interim period of indefinite duration would be allowed during
which the native courts would be "guided by" the Criminal Procedure
Code and the Evidence Ordinance.
52
In matters of appeal, the Native Courts Law, 1956, provides for a
generally uniform procedure. Appeal from a grade "B," "C," or "D"
court goes to the Provincial Court of the Province in which the native
court is situated. 53 Provincial Courts are native courts which were es-
tablished in 1960 in each provincial headquarters on the recommendation
of the Panel of Jurists. Unlike previous native courts of appeal, Pro-
vincial Courts are not basically courts of original jurisdiction.5 4 From
Provincial Courts appeals lie to the Sharia Court of Appeal in cases in-
volving questions of Moslem personal law and to the High Court in all
other cases.5 5 Provincial Courts do not have power to hear appeals from
grade "A" or "A limited" courts; appeals from these tribunals lie di-
rectly to the Sharia Court of Appeal in cases involving Moslem per-
sonal law and to the High Court in all other cases.56
The Provincial Courts, the Sharia Court and the High Court are all
Regional Government courts, entirely staffed and administered by Gov-
ernment. Thus, channels of appeal are completely outside the influence
of native authorities. Previously, the initial steps in the appeal process
had been through native authority courts, and delays and unpopular
decisions were on occasion attributed to the unwillingness of the appeal
courts to interfere with decisions of co-employees. The new appeal
process avoids this problem and, in addition, provides a simplified
and inexpensive procedure which is easy for the average person to
comprehend.
In matters of supervision and control through review and revision of
court decisions, the powers previously exercised by Residents and other
administrative officers had been withdrawn and placed in the hands of
a specialized corps of inspectors under the Ministry of Justice. 57 In its
51 Anderson, Conflict of Laws in Northern Nigeria: A New Start, 8 Int'l &
Comp. L.Q. 442, 453 (1959).
52 Statement by the Government of the Northern Region of Nigeria on the
Reorganisation of the Legal and Judicial Systems of the Northern Region 3
(Kaduna, 1958).
53 N.C.L., § 62.
54 A Provincial Court may assume original jurisdiction only upon the order
of the High Court or an inspector of native courts. In its original jurisdiction a
Provincial Court has the powers of a grade "A limited" native court.
55 N.C.L., § 66.
56 N.C.L., § 66.
57 N.C.L., Part VIII. Inspectors now come under the Judicial Department.
Delegation of Powers (Native Courts) Notice, 1966, § 2(b).
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second meeting, the Panel of Jurists considered that the system of re-
view by administrative officers was, by general consensus of opinion, out
of date and that the actual function of amending and revising native
court judgments should be performed by a court of appeal. It was recog-
nized, however, that while native courts were adjusting to the new Penal
and Criminal Procedure Codes and to new appellate procedures, admin-
istrative guidance would still be necessary, and the Inspectorate was
established for this purpose.
Although the Native Courts Law, 1956, and its amendments do re-
solve many of the major problems that have persisted in the development
of the native courts, the future of the system really lies in the manner
in which the reforms are assimilated. The rate of progress in modern-
izing the courts will not turn on the mere existence of legislative enact-
ments but on the effectiveness of the transitional techniques developed
to bridge the old system and the new. These techniques encompass four
basic areas: the "guidance" principle affecting criminal and evidentiary
procedure; the supervisory powers of inspectors of native courts; the
special role of courts of appeal; and the development of new concepts
in native tribunals.
IV
A. The "Guidance" Concept
In many ways, the principle of "guidance" serves as the philosophical
underpinning of the present course of development of the native court
system of Northern Nigeria although it is a legal concept which, strictly
speaking, applies only to the application of the Criminal Procedure
Code, 1960, and the Evidence Law. It is clear, for example, that the
existence of administrative control by an Inspectorate and the somewhat
paternalistic approach of courts of appeal to native court cases are in
fact a recognition that a flexible approach to native court administration
is needed and that native courts are to be "guided" in law and proce-
dure generally.
With regard to the administration of criminal justice specifically, the
theory is that "there should be an interim period during which the na-
tive courts [are] to be 'guided by,' rather than meticulously held to,"58
the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1960, and this is pro-
vided for in the Code. 59 The guidance concept does not apply to substan-
tive criminal law; in all cases the court must apply a specific section of
the Penal Code and satisfy itself-and a court of appeal, if necessary-
58 Anderson, supra note 51, at 454.
59 Criminal Procedure Code (1960) § 386(1).
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that each element is supported by evidence before convicting. Courts
are never permitted to resort to native criminal law.60
In this respect, it is interesting to compare the concept of guidance
as it has been applied to the African (local) courts of Uganda. It has
been held there that although African courts are to be guided by the
Penal Code and Criminal Procedure Code, "any attempt to administer
the Penal Code or Criminal Procedure Code must always result in an
unlawful exercise of power .... [G]uidance by statutes means no more
than that the African courts are to be guided by the principles embodied
in the legislation rather than by the express provisions themselves.'"
The situation in Northern Nigeria is actually the reverse side to the
Uganda guidance coin: native courts must apply the express provisions
of the Penal Code and attempt to apply the express provisions of the
Criminal Procedure Code although a lenient attitude will be taken
toward the latter. Only when a "failure of justice" results will reversal
be required.6 2
Of central importance is the fact that it is provided that certain pro-
visions of the Criminal Procedure Code-provisions considered basic
to a fair trial-are binding on native courts.0 8 The result is that while
variation is permitted in general procedural matters, uniformity is re-
quired with regard to matters affecting fundamental rights. Appeal
courts are thus given a device for dealing with appeals from a large
number of courts whose capacities vary widely, and variations in prac-
tice and procedure are permitted at the trial court level as long as a case
is decided within the limits of accepted notions of justice.
Although there have been several cases in which the High Court has
had to determine whether a native court has correctly applied the bind-
ing provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code, 64 there has been little
litigation in which the High Court has had to define or apply the guid-
60 "After the commencement of this Law no person shall be liable to punish-
ment under any native law or custom." Penal Code (1959) (ch. 89 of the Laws
of Northern Nigeria, 1963) § 3(2). Sections 387 and 388 of the Code provide,
however, that a man or woman may be guilty of adultry if he or she commits
certain acts and is "subject to any native law or custom in which extra-marital
sexual intercourse is recognized as a criminal offence."
61 Katahikire v. Eishengyero Criminal Appeal No. 107 of 1964, High Court of
Uganda; Monthly Bulletin, High Court, No. 62 (1964). See also West Nile Dis-
trict Administration v. Ndesi, reported [1965] Journal of African Law 74. [Journal
of African Law hereinafter cited as J.A.L.]
62 Criminal Procedure Code (1960) § 382. The test to be applied in determining
whether a failure of justice was occasioned is defined in Noma v. Zaria Native
Authority, 1963 Northern Nigeria Law Reports 97 [Northern Nigeria Law Re-
ports hereinafter cited as N.N.L.R.J.63 See Criminal Procedure Code (1960) §§ 388-95.
64 See cases cited in Richardson & Williams, The Criminal Procedure Code
of Northern Nigeria 220-32 (1963).
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ance principle. The outer limits have been drawn, however. In Adam
Shiwa v. Bornu Native Authority,65 the appellant had been convicted in
the Court of the Chief Alkali of Bornu of defamation under section 392
of the Penal Code. Under section 141 of the Criminal Procedure Code
no court may take cognizance of the offense of defamation except on the
complaint of the person aggrieved. In this case a police constable made
the complaint. The High Court noted that native courts are only to be
guided by section 141 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The Court held,
however, that the guidance principle cannot be used "to confer on a na-
tive court a jurisdiction which it does not possess, or to confer on a
trial court in this case a jurisdiction of which section 141 deprives all
courts."66
The most significant case on the question of guidance is Buraima
Ajayi and Julande Jos v. Zaria Native AuthorityYT The appellants had
been charged with a criminal offense before the Court of the Chief
Alkali of Zaria. The proceedings in the native court were in Hausa,
which the appellants neither spoke nor understood. They spoke Yoruba
and understood English, but not perfectly. The proceedings were inter-
preted by five different interpreters at successive stages. Two inter-
preted into English and one into Yoruba; it did not appear into what
language the others interpreted. None of the interpreters was sworn.
The High Court observed that on the record the conduct of the trial was
"irregular" because of the use of a series of interpreters who were not
bound by oath to interpret truly and whose ability to interpret satisfac-
torily may be questioned. The Court held, however, that the appellants
were unable to satisfy the Court that there was in fact a misinterpreta-
tion and that a failure of justice was occasioned; therefore the High
Court refused to upset the trial court's decision.
The case was further appealed to the Federal Supreme Court where
the decision of the native court was set aside. That Court, as a pre-
lininary matter, held that although the interpreters were not sworn as
provided in section 242 of the Criminal Procedure Code, native courts
are not bound by this section. Under the guidance concept, failure to
follow the provisions of section 242 could not itself be grounds for set-
ting aside the judgment. More importantly, however, the Court held that
irregularities in the method of interpretation constituted grounds for re-
versal. While agreeing with the High Court that the burden of showing
that an irregularity had led to a failure of justice is on the appellant, the
Supreme Court stated that in view of the difficulties in establishing in-
stances of misinterpretation, the burden is satisfied if it is shown that a
65 1964 N.N.L.R. 66.
66 Id. at 68.
67 1964 N.N.L.R. 51.
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reasonable person who was present at the trial might have supposed that
the interpretation was defective to such an extent as to deny the defen-
dant a fair trial. Justice must not only be done in native courts, it must
seem to be done. 68 The Court noted that the right to the assistance of an
interpreter is guaranteed by the Federal Constitution69 and the Consti-
tutional provision must be understood to mean the assistance of a com-
petent interpreter.
In procedural matters, it seems clear that the concepts of "guidance"
and "failure of justice" will not be stagnant formulations but, like the
concept of due process in American constitutional law, will serve as
standards "for judgment in the progressive evolution of the institutions
of a free society."'70 As greater understanding of the Criminal Proce-
dure Code is shared by the native courts and as legal training of native
court staff improves, the guidance principle may be narrowed and na-
tive courts held to a higher standard of performance.
Perhaps the most difficult guidance problems will come in connection
with the Evidence Law. At the same time that the Penal Code and
Criminal Procedure Code were introduced in the Northern Region and
made applicable to cases before the native courts, the Evidence Law was
amended to provide that in dealing with evidence in a criminal matter,
a native court must be guided by the Law. 71 In 1962 it was recommended
by the Panel of Jurists that "some basic provisions of the Evidence
Ordinance [now the Evidence Law] should be selected and made bind-
ing upon native courts," 72 but at present native courts are bound only
by provisions relating to burden and quantum of proof. 73
Because trials before native courts are not strictly governed by the
Law's rules of evidence or other evidentiary rules but are at the same
time subject to judicial review, there is created for courts of appeal the
problem of reviewing native court decisions without the relatively defi-
nite standards of the common law rules of evidence or those rules in-
68 It is interesting to compare Mbi v. Numan Native Authority, 1959 Northern
Region of Nigeria Law Reports 11 [Northern Region of Nigeria Law Reports
hereinafter cited as N.R.N.L.R.], a case decided by the High Court before the
Criminal Procedure Code (1960) became effective: the rule that justice should
not only be done but also be seen to be done "is one of the fundamental rules of
English law .... But we are not prepared to say that it is a rule of naturaljustice, or that its observance is required by good conscience or equity."69 Constitution of the Federation (Federal Nigeria Act, No. 20 of 1963)
§ 22(5) (e). See, however, the Constitution (Suspension and Modification) De-
cree No. 1 of 1966. A useful summary of legal and constitutional changes as of
April 4, 1966, is provided in Keay, Legal and Constitutional Changes in Nigeria
under the Military Government [1966] J.A.L. 92.
70 Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 414 (1945).
71 Evidence Law (ch. 40 of the Laws of Northern Nigeria, 1963) § 1(3). The
Evidence Law is derived from the Evidence Ordinance (ch. 63 of the 1948 Laws).
72 Anderson, supra note 39, at 287.
73 Evidence Law § 1(4) (added by N.N. No. 15 of 1963).
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corporated in the Evidence Law. This situation creates a difficult role
for the appeal courts. When the Evidence Law prevails, as it does in the
Magistrates' and District Courts, the High Court is aided by prior de-
terminations that certain evidence is unreliable or inadmissible. In the
guidance situation, however, it seems the appeal courts will be compelled
either to deal directly with the substantive aspect of the evidence in de-
termining what probative weight can be given to it or to go beyond
legislative directive and apply principles of the Evidence Law as though
they are in fact binding.
It is not surprising that the High Court has chosen this latter course
on several occasions. 74 However, while it is clear that certain eviden-
tiary concepts must be regarded as virtually binding-for example, an
appeal court could not uphold a conviction where an essential element
is based solely on non-expert opinion evidence7 5 -in most cases strict
reference to the Evidence Law would merely undermine the guidance
concept. 70 In circumstances where the appeal court is faced with appar-
ent violations of the Law's rules concerning best evidence, evidence of
a co-accused, confession evidence and the like, the court would seem
compelled to confront the problem not in terms of common law evidence
rules, which are primarily procedural in that they deal with admissibility,
but rather the weight that can be given to the evidence. In this re-
gard, the High Court might find assistance in such concepts as the
"substantial evidence rule" in appellate review of federal administrative
decisions in the United States. 77 Thus, instead of enforcing a strict ap-
plication of the hearsay rule and its exceptions listed under the Evidence
Law-which cannot be understood by most native courts in their present
state of development-an appeal court might apply a form of the hearsay
rule developed for the administrative process: "hearsay is admissible,
and may be used for probative purposes if: (1) it has probative value;
(2) it is reliable, as shown either by its source or by corroborating cir-
74 See Iyatawa v. Katsina Native Authority, 1961 Northern Nigeria Case Notes
12 (trial court relied on hearsay evidence in a situation not coming within the
dying declaration exception and on a Moslem Qasama oath, which is an expres-
sion of non-expert opinion); Arab v. Bauchi Native Authority, Criminal Appeal
JD/66CA/62, dated 6 August 1963 (admission of evidence of previous conviction
held reversible error).
75 Tittidabale v. Sokoto Native Authority, Criminal Appeal 78CA/61, dated 22
February 1962 (as proof of cause of death, trial court accepted testimony of
medical "dispenser" not shown to be skilled in determining causes of death).
76 Compare the situation where the Supreme Court of Nigeria and the West
African Court of Appeal have applied the Judges' Rules (rules laid down for the
guidance of police officers in taking confessions) to village heads (who, due to
lack of training, cannot be expected to be familiar with the Rules). Nweke v.Queen (1959) 4 F.S.C. 225; Fatumani v. R. (1950) 13 W.A.C.A. 39.
77 See Patterson, Hearsay and the Substantial Evidence Rule in the Federal
Administrative Process, 13 Mercer L. Rev. 294 (1962).
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cumstances; and (3) it is of a type which by its nature is capable of
refutation.17 8
In determining the extent to which rules under the Evidence Law are
to be applied to native courts, the legislature and the judiciary will have
to examine the reasons behind the various rules and determine what
evidentiary task or public policy is being advanced by the rule. A review
of this sort will not only be necessary for creating workable standards
for native courts to follow but could serve the additional purpose of re-
viewing the problem of what rules of evidence are relevant in the context
of Nigeria generally. The original Evidence Ordinance, passed in 1943,
was based on the 12th edition of Stephen's Digest of the Law of Evi-
dence and contains much that is not relevant to the African context and
excludes some matters of importance. In addition there are indications
that some of the rules of evidence may be based on a misinterpretation
of what the governing English law was in 1943. 79 A careful approach
to guidance problems could contribute much to a reform of evidence
rules generally in making them more suitable for the Nigerian situation.
B. Inspectors of Native Courts
The Government White Paper issued after the second meeting of the
Panel of Jurists indicated that the function of amending or revising a
native court judgment or sentence should now be performed by a court
of appeal rather than Residents and other administrative officers. It was
further indicated that a newly created corps of inspectors of native
courts, acting in supervisory capacities, would have access to court rec-
ords within the area of their individual jurisdictions; they "would be
empowered, whenever they come across a case in which they consider
justice to have miscarried, to refer that case to the court to which appeal
would have lain."80
However, while primary emphasis is given to review by way of the
normal appeal process, inspectors are given powers of revision and re-
view similar to those previously held by Residents. The reason for this
is that under the present system whereby native courts must apply the
Penal and Criminal Procedure Codes and must attempt to update their
78 Id. at 343.
79 Section 177(2) of the Evidence Law provides that where accused persons
are tried jointly and one gives evidence on his own behalf which incriminates a
co-accused, the former shall not be considered an accomplice. This appears to be
based on a misunderstanding of R. v. Barnes [1940] 27 Cr. App. R. 154. See the
rule stated in R. v. Rudd [1948] 32 Cr. App. R. 224 and Ajaegbu v. Inspector-
General 1956 N.R.N.L.R. 104. The Federal Supreme Court follows § 177(2)
strictly. Queen v. Asaba, All Nigerian Law Reports 673 (1961).80 Statement Made by the Government of Northern Nigeria on Additional Ad-justments to the Legal and Judicial Systems of Northern Nigeria, at 4 (Kaduna,
1962).
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procedures generally, errors which occur can, in many instances, be
dealt with more expeditiously by inspectors than by a formal court of
appeal. It was recognized by the Government that during the present
phase of adjustment of the native courts to new laws and procedures,
instances would arise where review, revision or other action by an in-
spector would be more practical and efficient than referral of the case to
a court of appeal. The exercise of quasi-judicial as well as administrative
powers by inspectors was seen to have the advantage of avoiding delay
and unnecessary expense to litigants in situations where appellate scru-
tiny is not essential. Moreover, the review or revision of certain cases
by an inspector who is in frequent contact with the court will often have
a greater educational impact on the court since the inspector is available
to explain to the court where an error was made or how a particular
procedure can be improved. Formal reports of appellate decisions can-
not often be cast in terms which will be readily comprehended by native
court personnel, particularly in light of the continuing language problem.
It is true, of course, that a number of these arguments apply in sup-
port of review by Residents. The acceptability of the present system,
however, is premised on the existence of several safeguarding factors:
emphasis is given to reporting a case on appeal, particularly in other
than routine cases; under the guidance of the Commissioner for Native
Courts, standards of review and revision are made more uniform; and
inspectors, as professionals within the Judicial Department, are more
suitable for the role of quasi-judicial officers.
It is important to observe that in calling for a specialized and legally
trained body of inspectors to supervise native court activity, the Panel
of Jurists not only rejected the principle of control by administrative
officers but also impliedly rejected the principle of judicial control other
than by appellate review of the native courts. At first appearance, the
initial exclusion of the native courts from the control of the High Court
of the Region might seem to have constituted a retreat from profession-
alization and from the long range goal of integration of the judicial
systems. It may be observed, for example, that the District and Magis-
trates' Courts of Northern Nigeria have always been under the super-
vision of the High Court and that the customary courts of several other
African states have long been under the supervision of their respective
High Courts.8' There were, however, a number of reasons for not in-
vesting the control function in the High Court, not the least of which
was the fact that the limited number of High Court judges would not
ha ie time adequately to supervise the more than 750 native courts found
in Northern Nigeria. Central to the development of the native court
81 See, e.g., African Courts Ordinance, 1957 (ch. 38 of the Laws of Uganda,
1964) §§ 26, 35.
NATIVE COURTS OF NORTHERN NIGERIA
system is the ability of inspectors to be available immediately to litigants
for quick and efficient investigation of complaints. Moreover, the in-
ability of most High Court judges to speak the local languages would
be a serious handicap to efficient control in a jurisdiction where the pro-
ceedings and records of the majority of courts are not in English.
The Government native courts edict of February, 1966, appears to
have recognized these facts. While placing the native courts under the
supervision of the Judicial Department, the Government at the same
time retained the inspectorate system, headed by the Commissioner for
Native Courts, as a unit within that Department. The combined effect
of immediate supervision by a corps of inspectors and ultimate control
by the High Court marks a significant move toward an increased sense
of professionalism and judicial independence within the native court
system. The administrative officers in whom powers of review and su-
pervision previously resided were often considered by native courts to
be external factors interfering with the normal functions of the court,
and in later years the administrative staff had less and less time to de-
vote to the supervision of the native court system due to other depart-
mental demands. Inspectors, on the other hand, as officers within the
Judicial Department, can be more readily regarded as an integral com-
ponent of the native court system. In addition, inspectors are trained
in native court law and procedure and several of the present inspectors
have themselves had considerable judicial experience in the native
courts.
The control exercised by inspectors of native courts is based on a
right of access to all native courts within Northern Nigeria and to the
records and proceedings of these courts.8 2 An inspector may examine
court records as a matter of routine or on the application of a litigant.
If during the course of such an examination an error in law or proce-
dure is detected, the inspector has a choice of alternatives: if the case is
still pending, he may stay proceedings83 and transfer or report the case
to another court with jurisdiction; if the case is completed, he may re-
port the case to an appropriate court of appeal or review the case himself.
If an inspector stays a case, it affords him sufficient time to examine
the records. A stay of this sort would be used, for example, where the
inspector has reason to suspect that the court may be without jurisdic-
tion over the person or subject matter. This power is particularly sig-
nificant since, as was noted earlier, the Native Courts Law, 1956, sets
specific monetary limits on the amounts which may be involved in par-
ticular civil cases before particular grades of courts,8 4 and the Criminal
82 N.C.L., § 55. Powers of inspectors must be specially conferred by the Chief
Justice, Delegation of Powers (Native Courts) Notice, 1966. See note 92 infra.
83 N.C.L., § 56(1).
84 See text accompanying note 45 supra.
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Procedure Code of Northern Nigeria prohibits certain grades of courts
from dealing with certain categories of offenses.8 5 Moreover, the power
to administer most civil legislation and miscellaneous criminal legisla-
tion must be specifically conferred. 86 A native court may erroneously
accept a case either through ignorance or through difficulty in correctly
classifying the case. In like manner, the Native Courts Law, 1956, im-
poses certain limitations concerning the persons who may be subject to
native court jurisdiction. In addition to native courts not generally hav-
ing jurisdiction over persons who do not come within the category of
persons "whose general mode of life is that of the general native com-
munity," they have no jurisdiction over companies.8 7 In instances where
the "company" concept is not clearly understood or where the source
of a debt is not clearly defined, a court may inadvertently accept a case
where one party to the action is a corporation.
If an inspector determines that the court should not continue with the
case for lack of jurisdiction or other reason, he may transfer the case to
another native court, a District Court or a Magistrate's Court, depend-
ing on which court has jurisdiction, or he may report the case to the
High Court.8 The High Court may either hear the case itself or direct
that some other court hear the case.
Upon the completion of a case by a native court, if an inspector is of
the opinion that there has been a miscarriage of justice in the case he
may, either on his own motion or in his discretion on the application of
any person concerned, report the case to the court to which an appeal in
such case would lie.8 9 The normal procedure, of course, is for a litigant
to pursue his own appeal without recourse to an inspector. In some in-
stances, however, the litigant may be ignorant of, or misunderstand, his
right of appeal or may be unaware that any grounds for appeal exist.
Since legal practitioners may not appear to act for or assist any party
before a native court,9 0 errors of law committed in the trial court may
not be apparent to a litigant. Without special grounds, however, an in-
spector would not normally exercise these powers on the application of
a party if the purpose were merely to circumvent routine appeal proce-
dure. And, in any case, an inspector is prohibited from exercising his
powers where an appeal has already been instituted. 91
As has been previously noted an inspector on whom the power of
review has been conferred may review any case in any court to which
85 See text accompanying note 46 supra.
86 N.C.L. § 24.
87 Northern Region Legal Notice [hereinafter cited as N.R.L.N.] 320 of 1957.
88 N.C.L., § 56(2).
89 N.C.L., § 58.
90 N.C.L., § 28.
91 N.C.L., § 59.
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he has access, either on his own motion or on the application of a person
concerned. Since the introduction of the inspectorate system in 1963, the
right of review for inspectors assigned to the provinces has been limited
to courts of grades B, C and D. Recently, however,-shortly after the
transfer of the Commission for Native Courts to the Judicial Depart-
ment-the power of review has been withdrawn altogether from seven-
teen inspectors and the Commissioner of Native Courts, reflecting the
High Court's reluctance to have administrative officers exercise judicial
power.9 2 As noted earlier, the power of review was to be used by an
inspector when appellate review did not appear necessary, as in the case
of a clear lack of jurisdiction or a clear error of law. Errors in relatively
routine matters are not uncommon in a court system where tribunals
must master much new law and procedure quickly, and review by an
inspector provides a quick and efficient method of correcting errors
without causing undue expense to the litigant or the state. Moreover,
review by inspectors relieves appellate courts of a considerable burden
and allows courts of appeal to devote more time to the more difficult
problems which a developing legal system presents. In spite of this it is
unclear whether the power of review will be restored by the Chief
Justice. 8
When a power of review is conferred, an inspector has four alter-
natives in disposing of the case: he may reverse, vary or confirm the de-
cision; he may make such order or pass such sentence as the lower court
could have made or passed; he may make some further order, such as
an order that a person imprisoned be released on bail; or he may set
aside a conviction, sentence or judgment or other order. If, after setting
aside a judgment, the inspector considers it desirable, he may order that
the case be retried either by the same court or some other court with
jurisdiction; or he may report the case to the High Court. In reaching
his decision the inspector may take any additional evidence that he
considers necessary. In making any further order in a case, or in vary-
ing a decision, the inspector may not increase a fine or sentence of
imprisonment or give an order in a civil case to the prejudice of any
party without giving the convicted person or such party an opportunity
to be heard.
94
Despite the fact that the displacement of Residents by a corps of
inspectors as the center of native court control means greater profes-
sionalization in native court supervision, there still remains the danger
92 N.N. Notice No. 341 of 1967 (27 April 1967); N.N. Notice No. 224 of
1967 (16 March 1967).
98 The power of review is not granted in the new Area Courts Edict, 1967.
See North-Western State Edict No. 1 of 1967 (The Area Courts Edict, 1967)
part VIII.
94 N.C.L., § 58(3) (a) (iii).
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that injection of administrative control into the judicial process may
undermine the influence and prestige of the courts. This danger is
significantly minimized by the fact that inspectors exercise restraint in
interfering in cases and attempt to make their presence as unobtrusive
as possible. Also, because the inspectorate is organized to perform an
educative and guiding function as well as to see that justice is done,
there is a continuing process of building up the competence of courts
at the same time that errors are being corrected. This educative func-
tion represents an important change in the theory of judicial supervision
and is the basis on which the position of native courts will be strengthened.
One reason why questions relating to the definition of "guidance"
and general guidance problems do not appear more often in appellate
decisions is that many of these problems are in fact resolved by inspec-
tors without recourse to appeal. Although the phrase "guided by" was
designed to ensure that appellate courts would take a "lenient and
paternalistic attitude towards imperfect attempts to apply a wholly
strange system,"9 5 it may be that the real impact of the guidance con-
cept will be through the corrective and guiding influence of the inspec-
tors of native courts.9 6
C. The Role of Courts of Appeal
In addition to the withdrawal of appellate jurisdiction from native
authority courts9 7 and the existence of a separate court of appeal for
matters of Moslem personal law,98 perhaps the most significant feature
of the native court appellate system is the governing law's conception
of the role of appeal courts. While in the United States the appellate
system is considered to be something quite distinct in the judicial process,
in Northen Nigeria appellate review of native court decisions tends to
be much more an extension of the trial. The High Court, the Sharia
Court of Appeal or a Provincial Court may, for example, hear additional
evidence, 99 review questions of fact as well as law 00 and review the
95 Anderson, supra note 51, at 454.
96 Education of native court staff is also pursued through training courses at
the Institute of Administration, Zaria, and in the Provinces under the sponsorship
of the Commission for Native Courts. In addition, the Commission issues periodic
circulars on points of law of interest to native courts and edits High Court and
Sharia Court of Appeal decisions for native court use. See, e.g., the Hausa edi-
tions, Labarin Wasu Shari'u A Jihar Nijeriya Ta Arewa, 1961 et seq. (Case
Notes of Northern Nigeria).
97 See text accompanying notes 53-56.
98 See text accompanying notes 55 and 56 supra. "Moslem personal law" is
defined in the Sharia Court of Appeal Law, 1960 (N.R. No. 16 of 1960) §§ 2, 12.
99 N.C.L., §§ 70(2), 70A(2). See Kumbin v. Bauchi Native Authority, 1963
N.N.L.R. 49 (evidence of doctor who examined deceased heard on appeal though
not at trial).
100 N.C.L., §§ 70(1) (b) (iii), 70(1) (A) (b) (ii), 70A(1) (a). See Kumbin v.
Bauchi Native Authority, 1963 N.N.L.R. 49 (High Court examined stick with
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propriety as well as the legality of a sentence. 10 ' In criminal cases an
appeal court may, "after hearing the whole case or not. and whether
in whole or in part," substitute any other decision which the court of
first instance could have made.10 2
In the United States, appeal courts "usually need not concern them-
selves directly with litigants, or even with questions of fact, but may
concentrate on questions of law and policy.' u0 3 In Northern Nigeria,
however, in the Sharia Court of Appeal and the Provincial Courts,
litigants appear on their own behalf 10 4 and the scope of review in all
appeals from native courts can be virtually as broad as the scope of the
original trial.
Section 9 of the Rules governing appeals to the High Court from
native courts'0 5 provides, for example:
At the hearing of the appeal the Appeal Court may allow, or
require, witnesses to be called whether or not they gave evidence
at the trial . . . and may do or order to be done anything which
it would have power to do or order had the case been before the
High Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction.
Section 11 (2) of the Sharia Court of Appeal Law provides that the
Court for all purposes of hearing an appeal ."shall have all the powers
... of every native court of which the judgment, order or decision is
the subject of an appeal . .. ."
In addition, there is less finality in the appeal process than, for exam-
ple, in England where "appeals terminate litigation, subject only to the
possibility of further review in a higher court or retrial (in civil but
not criminal cases) in the court below."'1 6 In appeals from native courts,
appellate tribunals in Northern Nigeria may order retrial in criminal
as well as civil cases and rehearings are not uncommon. 0 7
A third aspect of the role of appeal courts is the guidance given native
courts when retrial is ordered. The High Court will, on occasion, set
which blow was struck to determine whether death of person in sound state of
health could be caused).
101 N.C.L., §§ 70(1) (b) (iii), 70(1) (A) (b) (ii).. But see Bassa v. Jos Native
Authority, 1964 N.N.L.R. 49. (court cannot substitute a conviction merely as a
way to increase a sentence).
102 N.C.L., §§ 70(1) (b) (iii), 70(1) (A) (b) (ii). See Ihom v. Tiv Native Au-
thority, 1965 Nigerian Monthly Law Reports 472, 475 (High Court): "The
English Appeal Courts do not have the wide powers which are given to us by
section 70 Native Courts Law 1956."
'03 Karlen, Appellate Courts in the United States and England 157 (1963).
104 No legal practitioner may appear for or assist any party before these courts.
Sharia Court of Appeal Law, 1960, § 19; N.C.L., §§ 60(2), 28.105 The Northern Region High Court (Appeals from Native Courts) Rules,
1960 (N.R.L.N. 112 of 1960).
106 Karlen, supra note 103, at 158.
107 N.C.L., §§ 70(1) (b) (ii), 70(1) (A) (b) (i) (retrial in criminal cases)
§ 70A(1) (b) (retrial in civil cases) ; §§ 70(1) (b) (iii), 70(1) (A) (b) (ii) (re-
hearing in criminal cases) ; § 70A(1) (a) (rehearing in civil.cases).
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forth in detail the procedure to be followed by the trial court, particu-
larly when the retrial involves a matter of a technical nature, for exam-
ple the taking of medical evidence and the establishment of a witness'
expert qualifications. Thus, in the recent case of Zaria Native Authority
v. Aishatu Yar Dauda Bakori,'10 8 where the accused was deaf and dumb
and her capacity to stand trial was in question, the court indicated in
precise terms the type of evidence which it was advisable for the trial
court to hear and the procedure to be followed in taking the evidence.
Although the appellate process is constructed to provide maximum
flexibility in the review of cases and to ensure that all matters are de-
cided "according to substantial justice without undue regard to tech-
nicalities,"' 09 the appeal courts function within the framework of
traditional procedural safeguards. A substituted decision may be made
only if the appellant was accused of the substituted offense in the lower
court or if the appellate court is satisfied that the defense of the appellant
before the court of first instance would not have been substantially
affected if he had been so accused. 110 In addition, the High Court has
held that the intention of section 70(1) (b) (iii) of the Native Courts
Law, 1956, is to allow an appeal court to substitute a conviction for
another offense where the original conviction was wrong and not to
allow it to do so merely because it thinks that the offense deserves a
more serious punishment."' Appeals cannot be entertained unless the
appeal is entered in the strict manner specified by law.112
It is to be expected that some strains will be experienced in an appeal
system which attempts to maintain the type of flexibility contemplated
by the Native Courts Law, 1956, while at the same time incorporating
traditional appellate restraints. The appeal courts of Northern Nigeria
are confronted with the problem of utilizing certain trial court tech-
niques without becoming mere trial courts themselves. The problem has
presented itself in a number of cases in which the High Court has drawn
a distinction between "retrial" and "rehearing." In Igboke Oroke v.
Chuku Ede,113 a civil case appealed from a native court to a Provincial
Court, the unsuccessful plaintiff alleged that a vital witness in his favor,
who had been in court during the trial, did not give evidence. The
Provincial Court heard that witness and another of the plaintiff's wit-
108 1964 N.N.L.R. 25.
109 N.C.L., § 70C.
110 N.C.L., §§ 70(1) (b) (iii), 70(1) (A) (b) (ii). See Basharu v. Bornu Native
Authority, 1962 N.R.N.L.R. 50 (Federal Supreme Court).
11 Bassa v. Jos Native Authority, 1964 N.N.L.R. 49.
112 Audu v. Jos Native Authority, 1962 N.N.L.R. 46 (failure to file copies
of notice to appeal with lower court and make requisite deposit); Bauchi v.
Bauchi Native Authority, 1963 N.R.N.L.R. 45 (erroneous assumption of appellate
jurisdiction by Provincial Court).
118 Appeal No. MD/9A/1962, dated January 10, 1964. See also Atswaga v.
Agena, Appeal No. MD/34A/1963, dated January 10, 1964.
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nesses and also admitted a sketch plan which had been prepared for the
use of the Provincial Court. The Provincial Court reversed the trial
court judgment.
The case was further appealed to the High Court which held that
the Provincial Court erred in hearing additional evidence and in revers-
ing judgment on the basis of that evidence. The High Court declared
that an appeal court should not allow additional evidence to be adduced
unless the evidence could not by the exercise of reasonable diligence
have been obtained for use at the trial. Secondly, the High Court ob-
served that while section 70A(1) (a) of the Native Courts Law, 1956,
authorizes an appeal court to rehear a civil case and to reverse or vary
a decision on the basis of the rehearing, the rehearing must be confined
to the original case but no more. If additional witnesses are to be heard
or different evidence is to be adduced, the normal procedure is for the
court to order a retrial. Only if the new evidence were of a decisive
nature would reversal or variance of a decision be permissible. New
evidence "cannot as a rule do more than show that the trial court might
have come to a different decision if it had itself heard the additional
evidence. In such a case, the appeal court should order a retrial but is
not justified in reversing the trial judgment."u 4
The High Court's interpretation of section 70A of the Native Courts
Law is not compelled by a fair reading of the section. It provides:
(1) Any court exercising appellate jurisdiction in civil matters
under the provisions of this law may in the exercise of that
jurisdiction-
(a) After hearing the whole case or not, reverse, vary or con-
firm the decision of the court from which the appeal is
brought .. .
(b) quash any proceedings and thereupon where it is con-
sidered desirable, order any such cause or matter to be
heard de novo. ....
(2) In the exercise of its powers under this section a court may
hear such additional evidence that it considers necessary for
the just disposal of the case.
Subsection (2) refers to the exercise of the court's powers "under this
section" and would appear to apply to paragraph (a) as well as (b).
Nor is there any explicit restriction that the additional evidence has to
be evidence not available at the trial. In the past it seems to have been
a common practice in African courts, when hearing appeals, to call any
additional evidence that might be available."15 In the present stage of
development, however, the Court seems justified in enforcing a dis-
14 Oroke v. Ede, Appeal No. MD/9A/1962, dated January 10, 1964.
115 [1965] J.A.L. 74.
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tinction between trial and appeal processes. As the Court stated in
Oroke:
Once a case has been decided, the dispute should not be reopened
by trying the case again. . . Since a dispute is to be decided by
the trial court and not in the appeal court, each party must make
the whole of his case in the trial court . . . . [H]e should not be
allowed to improve on his case in the appeal court. 116
In the Provincial Courts particularly, where litigants appear on their
own behalf as in the lower courts, an emphasis on retrial in the court
below rather than on an expanded concept of rehearing seems desirable.
If the Provincial Court were able to have any additional evidence ad-
duced and were able to conduct a rehearing that is virtually a retrial,
the role of trial courts would be seriously undermined, particularly in
the minds of uneducated litigants. This argument is less forceful with
regard to proceedings in the High Court where the presence of lawyers
and English-trained judges gives the appellate procedure a formality
which sets it apart from the trial court procedure. But even in the High
Court it is questionable whether the Court should assume too many
trial techniques. Particularly in the context of a developing legal system
the High Court should perhaps place greater stress on its lawmaking
functions and concern itself as much with setting down guidelines for
the future as in seeing that justice is done in the particular case.
The Oroke case in which the rehearing-retrial distinction is developed
indicates the type of balance that will have to be maintained if the native
courts are to be effectively guided and litigants are to find justice with-
out at the same time undermining basic standards of appellate procedure.
D. Forum Reform
One principle that has been basic in the development of the native
courts of Northern Nigeria is that the courts should be acceptable to
the society which they serve. Deference to the needs and traditions of
the community is a central factor in the enduring effectiveness of the
courts today. As was noted earlier, when statutory native courts were
first created, the traditional composition of Moslem courts was not
respected and in many instances those persons who had traditionally
exercised judicial power were excluded from court membership. Both
of these shortcomings had to be eventually overcome through legislation.
More recently, the problem has been one of finding courts acceptable
to a mobile, mixed and commercial population. The creation of mixed
courts in the pre-war period served as an initial response to the problem
of mixed litigation 17 and, in many respects, as the Attorney-General of
116 Oroke v. Ede, Appeal No. MD/9A/1962, dated January 10, 1964. See also
Zaria v. Maituwo, 1966 Nigeria Monthly Law Reports 59.
117 See text accompanying note 34 supra.
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the northern region commented in 1956, "they have done very good
work and have been essential to the life of urban communities. Where
not created they have arisen spontaneously and have received subsequent
official recognition." 1 8 It might be said, however, that the value of these
courts lay less in their ability to solve legal conflicts according to strict
legal precepts than in their ability to merely provide solutions to prob-
lems that came before them. The strength of these courts has lain in
the fact that they have been composed of representatives of the major
tribal groupings in the community and thus have been acceptable forums
for persons from these tribes. Their weakness has lain in the fact that
in many instances the tribal representatives, as the oldest and most
respected members of their tribal communities, were cut off from the
main stream of development of their tribal laws and customs. In addi-
tion, the various representatives have frequently failed to agree on
decisions and have frequently quarreled. This has been due not only to
sectional pressures and partisanships but to the difficulty in applying
principles when there is a conflict of personal law. It is clear that in
recent years the mixed courts "have lost some of the favour with which
they were regarded and reform is required . . . ."19 The mixed courts
have served as a transitional technique of dispute-settling which now
needs revision.
An additional problem in finding a suitable forum arose in the situa-
tion where non-Moslems found themselves parties to actions before
Moslem courts and Moslems found themselves parties in actions before
non-Moslem courts. In rural areas the administration could not afford
a double system of native courts. Thus, a non-Moslem living in a pre-
dominately Moslem area was likely to find himself, in criminal cases
and in civil cases where he was a defendant, before a Moslem court.
Even in areas where mixed courts existed, there was nothing to compel
a Moslem court to transfer to the mixed court a case in which one or
both parties were non-Moslems. 120 In response to this problem in the
period just before national independence, it was proposed that non-
Moslem defendants before Moslem courts and Moslem defendants
brought before non-Moslem courts should be given the opportunity of
"opting out" of that court in favor of a more suitable tribunal. 121 The
proposal resulted in an amendment to the Native Courts Law, 1956,
which provided that in all cases before native courts the defendant must
be asked his religion. If the defendant were a Moslem in a non-Moslem
court or a non-Moslem in a Moslem court, the alkali or president of the
118 Northern House of Assembly Debates (March 8, 1956).
119 Brooke, supra note 23, at 83.
120 See Osuagwu v. Soldier, 1959 N.R.N.L. 39.
121 See Richardson, "Opting Out": An Experiment with Jurisdiction in North-
ern Nigeria, [1964] J.AL. 20.
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court was required to ask the defendant if he consented to having his
case tried before that court or if he desired to have the case tried in
another court. If the defendant elected to opt out, the Resident was to
be informed and he would direct in what court the case would be tried.122
The mere passage of this amendment in the period immediately pre-
ceding independence probably played a role in dispelling some of the
fears of non-Moslem minorities in the North and in easing the move-
ment toward self-government, but the device created a number of
problems.123 More importantly, there was in the very concept of a
choice of forums the underlying implication that there was special merit
in being tried in one court rather than another. It was recognized that
the opting out provision would, in the long run, only serve to undermine
public confidence in native courts generally and to deepen existing divi-
sions. Thus in 1961, after the adoption of the new Penal and Criminal
Procedure Codes and the establishment of an independent appellate
system, the opting out experiment was repealed. 124
Although the judicial reforms in criminal law and appellate procedure
did much to alleviate the problems that had given rise to the opting
out device, it was seen that instances would undoubtedly arise in which
access to a native court disassociated from local loyalties would be
desirable. Consequently, in 1963 when the native court inspectorate
system was established, it was provided in the Native Courts Law that
if it should appear to an inspector or to the High Court that "it is
necessary for the purpose of securing, as far as possible, a fair and
impartial trial" or "it is expedient in the interests of justice generally,"
that a particular matter should not be tried at first instance by the native
court having jurisdiction to do so, an inspector or the High Court may
order the matter to be tried at first instance by the Provincial Court
of the particular province. 125 This technique provided the opportunity
of access to a native court divorced from local loyalties but placed the
option in the hands of the inspector or High Court, who can exercise
122 N.C.L., § 15A (added by the Native Courts (Amendment) Law, 1958).
128 The section was used to obtain postponements in cases and inspired cases
of apostasy before Moslem courts. The wording of the section as originally written
implied that there was not only a right to opt out but also a right to choose the
court of trial. The Native Courts (Amendment) Law, 1960, remedied some of the
procedural problems.
124 The Native Courts (Amendment) Law, 1961. Compare the following state-
ment in Cotran, African Conference on Local Courts and Customary Law, IV J.
of Local Ad. Overseas 128, 132 (1965): In most countries there are provisions
"whereby a party could apply for a transfer from the local courts to a court where
legal representation [is] allowed either as of right or at the discretion of the court,
and the Conference commended these provisions . .. ."125 N.C.L., § 63. Original jurisdiction of Provincial Courts is no longer de-
pendent on the prior order of the High Court or an inspector. The Native Courts
Law (1956) (Amendment No. 2) Edict, 1967 (Edict No. 4 of 1967).
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independent judgment. Inspectors can also make transfers to other
courts, and since this power is exercised in the inspector's discretion,
the problems inherent in the former opting out procedure are not
present. 126
Experience with original jurisdiction in the Provincial Courts has
indicated the usefulness of access to a Government native court in cer-
tain cases and has led to the recent creation of a new type of tribunal
which represents an important departure in the concept of native courts
in Northern Nigeria. These new courts, termed "Area Courts," are
Government courts of original jurisdiction and are uniquely qualified
to meet the legal needs of the communities in which they exist.127 As
Government courts, they possess independence from local associations
and loyalties. As Government courts staffed by sole judges of high
caliber, they are able to deal effectively with problems of mixed law
and to avoid many of the problems inherent in the mixed court situa-
tion.128 In addition, because the Area Courts are presided over by
traditional native judges of high qualifications, the courts are able to
deal with important commercial litigation involving indigenous traders
in commercial and industrial centers. Indigenous traders generally prefer
to have their problems dealt with in such courts where procedures are
less expensive and are simpler and speedier than in the British-modeled
District Courts or High Court. Area Courts have a further advantage
over the District and High Courts in that Area Court judges are able
to speak at least one of the native languages and are familiar with local
laws and customs. The Area Courts, in short, provide many of the
advantages of both the native courts and the non-native courts without
their respective limitations and represent an important development in
adjusting the native court system to modern problems and procedures.
The recent Government decrees withdrawing all native courts from
the control of the Ministry of Justice and the native authorities repre-
sents a logical next step in divorcing the courts from political control.129
The effect of the decree, however, will probably not be felt immediately
as was the creation of Government Provincial and Area Court. Pre-
sumably, it will still be necessary for the Chief Justice to appoint court
126 N.C.L. § 56(2).
127 N.C.L., Part IX(A). Area Court judges and all staff of Area Courts are
public officers in the public service of the Government. N.C.L., § 70E(2). The
"Area Courts" referred to in the text are not to be confused with "area courts,"
the new terminology for all native courts as of April 1, 1968. See notes 3 and 40
supra. On that date the Area Courts referred to in the text will be merged into
the general governmental court system of each state and will also be called area
courts.
128 Area Courts, however, have not replaced mixed courts.
129 Delegation of Powers (Native Courts) Notice, 1966.
BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
personnel from groups of nominees put forth by the native authorities.
Moreover, the isolation of many of the courts from the center of govern-
ment will continue to enforce a close working relationship between the
native authorities and court personnel. But undoubtedly the degree of
local government control will be lessened.
V
The philosophy underlying the institutional development of native
courts in Northern Nigeria has been one of building upon the basic
indigenous court structure. Governing legislation has been directed
toward improvement and adjustment rather than displacement of the
indigenous system.
In certain respects, there has been little practical alternative to this
course of action. Any significant substitution of Magistrate's and Dis-
trict Court jurisdiction for native court jurisdiction is impossible at
this stage because of the extremely small number of professionally
trained lawyers in the North. Lawyers from outside the North would
encounter immediate problems of language and unfamiliarity with local
social systems and would of course face difficulties in gaining the con-
fidence of local populations. Equally important is the fact that as long
as recognition is given to native law and custom in civil matters and
as long as different laws continue to apply to different classes of persons,
it is necessary to retain court personnel familiar with these laws.
Moreover, from the point of view of the long range development of
an effective system of legal institutions and norms, the present govern-
ment policy of strengthening and upgrading native courts, as opposed to
a displacement of these courts in favor of institutions received from
non-indigenous sources, seems essential. The various native laws and
customs governing civil affairs must eventually give way to codification,
unification and modernization. Yet, unless native law and custom is to
be merely abandoned in favor of imported laws, it is important to have
on the legal scene men who understand these tribal laws and who can
participate in their rationalization and unification. These men can play
a significant role not only in seeing that certain indigenous social values
are maintained when codifications are made but also in facilitating
acceptance of new laws in their communities.
And, indeed, even with regard to criminal matters where modern
Penal and Criminal Procedure Codes prevail, it is important at this
stage to have the law administered by judges who are intimately familiar
with local social and cultural conditions and who can, as their training
progresses, perceive ways in which the Codes can be "Nigerianized" to
meet local needs. While a certain amount of deference to, local values is
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shown in the Northern Nigerian Penal Code, 30 the Code is still largely
an "imported" one.
In the long run, of course, the goal must be one of bringing together
the best aspects of native and professional courts. The Area and Pro-
vincial Courts represent important steps in this direction. By attracting
men of high caliber who combine extensive legal training with knowledge
of local laws and customs, these courts are able to deal with a broad
range of cases. The Area Courts have already shown a competence to
deal with rather complex commercial and non-commercial litigation and
appear to have attracted the confidence of the growing body of indige-
nous traders as well as the general population. It is through such courts,
as well as through upgrading of more traditional forums, that the goals
of modernization, unification and Africanization of legal institutions and
norms can be realized.
Central to this whole scheme of development is the problem of educa-
tion, not only for native court judges and staff but also for inspectors of
native courts, High Court judges and practicing lawyers. Central also
is improved communication between the High Court (and to a lesser
extent the District and Magistrate Courts) on the one hand and the
native courts on the other.
The effective functioning of the inspectorate system depends largely
on the recruitment of men knowledgeable in native law and custom, mod-
ern criminal law and local languages. Such men are difficult to come by
and heretofore some of the best work by inspectors has been done by
two-man teams of western-trained lawyers and indigenous personnel
trained in native court matters.' 3 '
In the past the High Court, staffed by expatriate, British-trained
lawyers, has been markedly isolated from native court matters. Clearly,
if the High Court is to set sound native court policy, either judicially
or administratively, its members must become more familiar with these
courts. The transfer of the Commission for Native Courts to the Judicial
Department, while primarily aimed at divorcing the Commission from
130 See, for example, note 60 supra (deference to native law and custom in
adultery cases). The Penal Code (1959) § 403 punishes consumption of alcohol
by a Moslem and is, in effect, a codification of Moslem law. Offenders who are of
the Moslem faith may be liable to the punishment of the traditional haddi lashing
"as prescribed by Moslem law" for offences contrary to certain sections of the
Penal Code (1959) relating to adultery, defamation and the drinking of alcohol.
Penal Code (1959) § 68. See also Criminal Procedure (Haddi Lashing) Order
in Council, 1960 (N.R.L.N. 85 of 1960) which codifies the traditional method of
carrying out the haddi punishment.
131 The two-year diploma course at the Institute of Government, Zaria is
directed toward the training of inspectors of native courts and area court judges.
See Milner, Legal Education and Training in Nigeria, Nigerian Law-Some Re-
cent Developments 131 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. (Supp. No. 10, 1965).
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political influence, may have the additional and unanticipated benefit of
making the High Court more aware of native court problems and of
improving communications between the two judicial systems.
Generally overlooked is the role of the practicing lawyer. As noted
earlier, lawyers are not permitted to appear before native courts. This
does not mean, however, that lawyers cannot advise persons within the
jurisdiction of native courts. In recent years this counseling function
has been clearly increasing among the lawyers in Kaduna and Kano,
yet practicing lawyers have frequently sought out the guidance of the
Commission for Native Courts, frankly professing ignorance of all law
relating to native courts. Moreover, as lawyers trained for the English
bar, they have been unfamiliar with the client-counseling aspects of law
practice.'8 2 Much depends on the education of lawyers trained in Niger-
ian law schools in the fields of native court law and native law and
custom, as well as the common law.'8 8 The emergence of such lawyers
equipped to counsel clients who will appear before native courts may
help to lay the foundation for eventual acceptance of trained lawyers as
judges and advocates in native courts.
182 For the background to this state of affairs see Gower, Independent Africa,
the Challenge to the Legal Profession 104-17 (1967).
183 See Milner, supra note 131, at 115.
